sebuah tjerita jang menarik untuk dicermati :

Sukarno, recognizing the need for some kind of a political will,
consented, but he cleverly divided his legacy among four heirs—
Tan Malaka, Iwa, Sjahrir, and Wongsonegoro—the last-named a
respected old-line nationalist with no following. Sukarno felt that
this group was representative of the main currents of the revolu-
tion—Sjahrir, the Marxist; Wongsonegoro, the nationalist; and
Iwa, a devout Moslem, his Communist background notwithstand-
ing. Sukarno preached that only by a blending of these three forces
—Marxism, nationalism, and lslamn—could the revolution succeed
and the republic survive. In his mind, perhaps, Tan Malaka em-
bodied a coalition of these three forces. Although Tan Malaka
was disappointed by the will, the very fact that Sukarno had
drafted a testament suited his designs admirably. As expected, the
news of the testament spread rapidly, although its contents were
kept secret (and have yet to he of€cially disclosed).

Now Tan Malaka drafted a new testament, in which he
alone was named political heir. He then proceeded to the interior
and spread rumors that Sukarno and Hatta were captives of the
Dutch and that Sjahrir was in the pay of the British. By transfer-
ring tIme government to Jogjakarta, Sukarno exposed the absurdity
of Tan Malaka’s charges.

Apparently, Sukarno now felt that he could use Tan Malaka
to depose Sjahrir, for Sukarno believed that Sjahrifs democratiza-
tion program and conciliatory attitude toward the Allies had been
pursued too far. Sukarno therefore encouraged Tan Malaka to
capitalize on the widespread Opposition to Sjahrir’s policy of
negotiations with the Dutch and British by Constructing a broad
united front behind the government to achievve this, Tan Malaka
organized the Persatuan Perjuangan (Fighting Front) at
Purwokerfo.Within a short interval the PP succeeded in
enrolling 141 parties and organization “without the slightest
difficulty.”  Both the Masyumi and PNI entered PP, as
did the Socialists and other parties of the Left that had blossomed
after the introduction of the multi party sysfem.* No party could
afford to dissociate itself from a front that enjoyed Presidential
couragement and was ostensibly organized to marshal the
country behind the government.
By January 28, Tan Malaka appasently felt sufficiently secure
draft a seven-point Persatuan program, which, he felt, the
moderate Sjahrir would reject. The “mininium demands” called

-Negotiations on the basis of the 100 per cent recognition of In-
doncsian independence.
-Composition of the government in harmony with the tendenCLes
among the people.
-Composition of the [Army) in harmony with the tendencies among
the people.
-Disarming of Japanese forces.
-Confiscation and exploitation of enemy [Dutch] estates.
-Confiscation and exploitation of enemy [Dutch~ factories.

Sjahrir confounded Tan Malaka by endorsing the program. Tan
Malaka countered by demanding its immediate implementatiOns
move that made it clear that Tan Malaka’s primary objective
‘as to topple Sjahrir. The parties of the Left, Sjahrir’s main
force of strength, resigned from the Persatuan; the Masjumi, by
then in the cabinet, wavered. On February 28, Sjahrir, who considered

Sukarno a coarchitect of the Tan Malaka strategy, abruptly
resigned as Premier. Sukarno, forced to choose between Sjahrir
nd Tan Malaka, recognized the ambitious Tan Malaka as the
greater personal threat and turned again to Sjahrir. On March 2,
Sjahrir returned to office. Tan Malaka, enraged by Sukarno’s
deception, set about to attain power by a coup d’etat. His plans
were thwarted, however, when the government arrested him and a
number of aides, including Yamin and Chaerul Saleh, on March
17. His arrest, meanwhile, generated disorders at Surakarta,
Central Java, largely between the Barisan Banteng (Buffalo Le-
gion) and the Pesindo (Socialist Youth), which supported the


Indonesia Communism by Brackman p. 48-49