Saya tulis ulang berdasarkan dua buku yakni Indonesian .. by Arnold Brackman yg terbit tahun 1963 dan Sjahrir:exile dari Mrazek yang terbit tahun 1994. Kedua buku ini walaupun ditulis dalam rentang yang sangat lama, tapi saling mengisi walaupun ada kontradiksi antara satu dan lain. 
Timbul pertanyaan kritis baru, seperti :

1. Apakah Bung Karno terlibat dalam pemebentukan Persatuan Perjuangan ?
2. Apakah Pidato Tan Malaka di Purwekerto dimaksudkan untuk menggeser Sjahrir atau justru beraliansi dengan Sjahrir ?
3. Apakah Sjahrir menganggap Bung Karno terlibat dalam usaha kejatuhan kabinetnya yang pertama ?
4. Apa yang terjadi pada sidang KNIP di Surakarta pada 26 February 1946 yang dihadiri tan malaka, soekarno dan Sjahrir ?

Karena ini sejarah yang sangat penting dan crucial, bagian bagian sejarah yang penting saya tebalkan.
MOHON JIKA ADA INFORMASI TAMBAHAN, Silahkan add di comments.




…….Pag 312:

Tan Malaka’s Politik, as we noticed, had been announced as a book “as big as Sjahrir’s. Muhammad Jamin published his “Tan Malaka: Father of the Indonesia Republic” in Berita Indonesia, where Sjahrir’s influence was also strong. Subadio Sastrosatomo follower of Sjahrir, wrote later:

I saw the efforts of the people’s congress, which took place in Purwokerto, a efforts to put Tan Malaka into the limelight [ menonggolkan Tan Malaka], and to shake [ the position of Soekarno].

I did not see the congress a opposition against the cabinet of Sjahrir….

The emergence of Tan Malaka and his coming up with the Minimum Program at the Purwokerto people’ congress, had, indeed, been an effort… to continue the spirit of the Testament [ Sjahrir together with Tan Malaka were mentioned as Sukarno’ and Hatta’s successorsj. 

Benedict Anderson suggested that Tan Malaka, if he had built a powerful political organization to support him, might have played a role in the Indonesian revolution comparable to that of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. According to Anderson,. the only other attempt in the post-surrender years, besides Sjahrir’s “Our Struggle” to analyze systematically and to give a coherent perspective to the Revolution the writings and speeches by Tan Malaka. It is impossible to say what might happened, if these two extraordinary men, during late 1945 and early 1946, had been able to work together 
Adam Malik dated the beginning of “separation” of Tan Malaka from Sjahrir at the “time of Purwokerto,” which is at the begining of January. Amir Sjarifoedin wrote later that Tan Malaka and his group were not “wholly in agreement” Sjahrir’s cabinet policies “already in January.” 

According to Sjahrir himself “animosity” and “bitterness” arose between his and Tan Malaka’s camps months” after the cabinet was formed, thus again in mid-January.

One thing was striking. Both men, Sjahrir and Tan Malaka, appeared to play a passive role in the separation. “Others,” neither Sjahrir nor Tan Malaka, appeared to be be the principal actors.


According to Subadio’s memoirs:

It was Abdoelmadjid who was sent as a representative of the Socialist Party
[ Amir and Sjahrir] to the people’s congress at Purwokerto. He reported
back about the congress to other party leaders—Amir Sjarifoeddin, Tan Ling
Djie and myself…. He explained the events as a true Marxist-Stalinist, and
in terms of the Comintem and Dimitrov line. Thus, he described Tan Malaka
as a Trotskyist, which is a renegade, an opponent, and an enemy…. Amir
Sjarifoeddin, as a member of cabinet believed that the congress was an effort
to begin an opposition, and thus it was not difficult for him to accept the
ideolOgical explanation which Abdoelmadjid, and also Tan Ling Djie,

I asked L. N. Sitoroes, a political companion of Sjahrir, and also a man who was
known at the time for his liking of Tan Malaka, if Sjahrir and Tan Malaka could ever
have made it to the top and led the Republic together. “No way,” Sitoroes answered,
“it could not be done. Not in the Indonesia of the time. At least one of them would
have to be a Javanese.”

It seems that Tan Malaka and Sjahrir were increasingly being used. It also seems
that they both failed at the same historical moment, for the same reason and, per-
haps, by the same design. The scene of the failure of both of them was the center, the
fortress—Yogyakarta, the Javanese interior, the place where Sukarno, as we noted
above, “came into his own.” 

On February 6, 1946, in Yogyakarta, the executive of the Masjumi, the Islamic
and strongly nationalist republican political party, making public its loss of patience
with compromises with the West, declared its non-confidence in Sjahrir’s cabinet.
The Indonesian National Party—close to Sukarno, resembling strongly the prewar
Partindo and also led by Sartono, Sukarno’s lifelong ally, and Sjahrir’s life-long
rival—immediately followed suit.

On February 17, Sukarno, in Yogyakarta, decided to speak out. Reading his
speech later, one can not but be impressed by how much and how well Sukarno used Tan Malaka’s rhetoric and Tan Malaka’s flame; and how he was able, at the same time, to display truly paternal benevolence when speaking about Sjahrir:


Be confident that our prime minster will not swerve in his determination to maintain the demand for 100 per cent independence [ Freedom]. But if it should ever turn out that Sjahrir is not maintaining the demand for 100% independence [ Freedom] that all of you, my brothers, want, then I have the right to dismiss him.

On February 23, Sjahrir, traveling hastily from Jakarta on the Special Train to Yogyakarta,sent Sukarno a secret letter of resignation. This still might have been, and it probably was, just a tactical step. On February 26, according to Tan Malaka, Sjahrir also demanded to see him. “I hurried to Yogyakarta to meet him on February 26, 194 wrote Tan Malaka, “However the meeting never took place.”

On the same day, February 26, in Surakarta, a Javanese princely town an hour’s drive from Yogyakarta, and in the Solo Valley, a plenary meeting of the “Central In donesian National Council,” took place. The delegates did not know about the letter of resignation which Sjahrir had sent three days earlier, and to which Sukarno had not yet responded. The meeting started with Sjahrir reporting “what he had attained through his conferences with the Dutch and the British till now.” 

Then Sukarno took the rostrum.
Sukarno began by handing Sjahrir a big file of “about 250 telegrams from local
leaders.” Then turning to the audience, Sukarno spoke out:

All these telegrams demand exactly the same—”lOO% Freedom,” and that a war against the Dutch be declared. Further, all these men and women ask that the conferences [ the foreigners in Jakarta] be stopped. One has been conferring for four months already and nothing is achieved…. The Dutch made me duck. Each subsequent day they come one more step in my direction. Because they were not in a state to play an open game, they called in the British. My boys are depicted as war criminals by them, and so am

After Sukarno, Tan Malaka was given the platform. This probably was the cru cial speech in the old man’s life. During “a heated exchange of words,” a report says, Tan Malaka urged Sjahrir “not to drift too much to the Dutch side. Sjahrir then asked Sukarno to permit his cabinet to be expanded. This Sukarno waved away by saying that this should be decided by the plenum.

At the next session of the “Central Indonesian National Council,” held two days later, on February 28, many further telegrams from Sukarno’s file were read—so many, indeed, that it took the whole session, and any further decision on the fate of Sjahrir’s cabinet had to be delayed till March 2.

On March 2, more telegrams were read, and then Sukarno gave another speech:

We are in war, the Indonesian Republican Army must be strengthened. Its
strength shall be brought up to 1,000,000 men.. .. A course is already em-
barked upon to develop an “Indonesian atom bomb” filled with nitrogen.
No Dutchman shall be admitted into our offices and into our public enter
prise. Eurasians may be appointed only when this is especially approved by
the President.

Now, it was no more Tan Malaka’s but Sukarno’s flame. It was also announced
that “Soekarno would not go to Jakarta, and would not negotiate with the Dutch.”
This also was the moment when Sjahrir resigned—as he said later—”because I could
not get enough cooperation from the top Ieadership.”

Some people believed that with Sjahrir defeated, Tan Malaka might be offered
Sjahrir’s job. According to Hatta, however, he and Sukarno now decided to block
Tan Malaka’s road to power.

The weakened Sjahrir was used. Hatta announced a new cabinet on the very day
of Sjahrir’s resignation. Sjahrir again was its premier, but, without Sjahrir being able
to resist, a few new people entered his cabinet, representing the Masjumi and the In
donesian National Party. Significantly, Sjahrir called the program of his second
cabinet “Soekarno’s ‘five points’.” Tan Malaka, in his own way, spoke about the
same thing. He criticized the second Sjahrir cabinet, but, as Anderson commented,
It is very noticeable that in his critique Tan Malaka makes almost no mention
of Sjahrir but constantly refers to the “Soekarno-Hatta government,” in effect
attributing the program to those two men.

On March 17, 1946, two weeks after the crisis, Tan Malaka, together with some of
his followers, Abikoesno, Jamin, and Soekarni, was arrested in Surakarta. “I did not
know,” Tan Malaka wrote in 1948, two years later, and when still in prison, “I did
not understand who did it, why, and on what official authority.”
It appears again that “others,” neither Sjahrir nor Tan Malaka, were the main
actors. Of course, Sjahrir was prime minister at the time of the arrest. Amir Sjarifoed
din, the minister of defense—his signature was on the warrant—later claimed that he



Up to this point in the developing revolution, the orthodox Communists were almost conspicuous by their absence. Not so the national Communists. From the outset, Tan Malaka maneuvered to widen the split between Sukarno and Sjahrir. He first approached Sjahrir and proposed that the resistance forces join with his own group in deposing the “fascist” Sukarno. Tan Malaka was apparently unenthusiastic about making an attempt to seize 

direction of the revolution without first eliminating Sukarno. As Tan Malaka doubtlessly expected, Sjahrir rebuffed him. Accordingly, Tan Malaka embarked on a daring and amateurish scheme to attain power by duplicity. He sought to capitalize on the growing unrest in Batavia by inducing Sukarno to draft a political will designating him as sole heir in the event that harm befell Sukarno and Hatta, which was probable once such a testament was signed. Sukarno, recognizing the need for some kind of a political will, consented, but he cleverly divided his legacy among four heirs-Tan Malaka, Iwa, Sjahrir, and Wongsonegoro–the last-named a respected old-line nationalist with no following. Sukarno felt that this group was representative of the main currents of the revolution–Sjahrir, the Marxist; Wongsonegoro, the nationalist; and Iwa, a devout Moslem, his Communist background notwithstanding. Sukarno preached that only by a blending of these three forces –Marxism, nationalism, and Islam–could the revolution succeed and the republic survive. In his mind, perhaps, Tan Malaka embodied a coalition of these three forces. Although Tan Malaka was disappointed by the will, the very fact that Sukarno had drafted a testament suited his designs admirably. As expected, the news of the testament spread rapidly, although its contents were kept secret (and have yet to be officially disclosed).

Now Tan Malaka drafted a new testament, in which he alone was named political heir. He then proceeded to the interior and spread rumors that Sukarno and Hatta were captives of the Dutch and that Sjahrir was in the pay of the British. By transferring the government to Jogjakarta, Sukarno exposed the absurdity of Tan Malaka’s charges.

Apparently, Sukarno now felt that he could use Tan Malaka to depose Sjahrir, for Sukarno believed that Sjahrir’s democratization program and conciliatory attitude toward the Allies had been pursued too far. Sukarno therefore encouraged Tan Malaka to capitalize on the widespread opposition to Sjahrir’s policy of negotiations with the Dutch and British by constructing a broad united front behind the government. To achieve this, Tan Malaka organized the Persatuan Perdjuangan (Fighting Front) at Purwokerto. Within a short interval, the Persatuan succeeded in enrolling 141 parties and organizations “without the slightest difficulty.”4 Both the Masjumi and PNI entered the Persatuan, as did the Socialists and other parties of the Left that had blossomed after the introduction of the multi-party system. * No party could afford to dissociate itself from a front that enjoyed Presidential ncouragement and was ostensibly organized to marshal the country behind the government.

By January 28, Tan Malaka apparently felt sufficiently secure to draft a seven-point Persatuan program, which, he felt, the moderate Sjahrir would reject. The “minimum demands” called for

Negotiations on the basis of the [100 per cent] recognition of Indonesian independence.

Composition of the government in harmony with the tendencies among the people.

Composition of the [Army] in harmony with the tendencies among the people.

Disarming of Japanese forces.

Confiscation and exploitation of enemy [Dutch] estates.

Confiscation and exploitation of enemy [Dutch] factories.

Sjahrir confounded Tan Malaka by endorsing the program. Tan Malaka countered by demanding its immediate implementation, a move that made it clear that Tan Malaka’s primary objective was to topple Sjahrir. 

The parties of the Left, Sjahrir’s main source of strength, resigned from the Persatuan; the Masjumi, by then in the cabinet, wavered. On February 28, Sjahrir, who considered Sukarno a coarchitect of the Tan Malaka strategy, abruptly resigned as Premier. Sukarno, forced to choose between Sjahrir and Tan Malaka, recognized the ambitious Tan Malaka as the greater personal threat and turned again to Sjahrir.On March 2, Sjahrir returned to office. 

Tan Malaka, enraged by Sukarno’s deception, set about to attain power by a coup d’etat. His plans were thwarted, however, when the government arrested him and a number of aides, including Yamin and Chaerul Saleh, on March 17. His arrest, meanwhile, generated disorders at Soerakarta, Central Java, largely between the Barisan Banteng (Buffalo Legion) and the Pesindo (Socialist Youth), which supported the government.